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ABSTRACT
Extending the military principle of maneuver into the war-fighting domain of cyberspace, academic and military researchers have produced many theoretical and strategic works, though few have focused on researching the applications and systems that apply this principle. We present a survey of our research in 
developing new architectures for the enhancement of parallel and distributed applica-
tions. Specifically, we discuss our work in applying the military concept of maneuver 
in the cyberspace domain by creating a set of applications and systems called “ma-
neuverable applications.” Our research investigates resource provisioning, application 
optimization, and cybersecurity enhancement through the modification, relocation, 
addition or removal of computing resources.  
We first describe our work to create a system to provision a big data computational re-
source within academic environments. Secondly, we present a computing testbed built 
to allow researchers to study network optimizations of data centers. Thirdly, we discuss 
our Petri Net model of an adaptable system, which increases its cyber security posture 
in the face of varying levels of threat from malicious actors. Finally, we present evidence 
that traditional ideas about extending maneuver into cyberspace focus on security 
only, but computing can benefit from maneuver in multiple manners beyond security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace research has focused on applying traditional military doctrine and strat-
egies into this new operational domain [3]. Two of the more popular concepts and topics 
have been situational awareness [4,  7] and key terrain [14]. An essential military principle 
that has received extensive theoretical investigation is maneuver [5]. This theoretical 
research has laid the foundation and created opportunities to build systems that 
possess the features of maneuver. 
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Maneuver is one of the U.S. Army’s nine Princi-
ples of War. Maneuver includes the application of 
combat power to maintain an advantage over the 
enemy [15]. The flexible and dynamic employment of 
resources ensures success by keeping adversarial 
conditions imbalanced and thus reduces failures, 
compromises, and vulnerabilities. The non-military 
use of the word maneuver describes an action that 
is not random or without purpose, but one that is 
clever or skillful. In both environments, the word 
maneuver implies deliberate movement and actions 
taken to achieve a specific purpose. 
Distributed and parallel applications allow the 
execution of complex computations that previously 
were deemed impractical. Many recent technolog-
ical advances have contributed to the widespread 
growth of distributed computing, namely multi-core 
processors, multi-processor nodes, high-speed net-
works, improved storage technologies, and virtu-
alization. Regional and national researchers have 
combined funding and resources to build expansive, 
large-scale shared computing clusters to allow more 
efficient usage of power, space, and cooling to multi-
ple user groups. These shared computing resources 
have become the standard high-performance com-
putational platforms that annually appear on the 
list of the most powerful commercially available 
computer systems. Even with these tremendous 
achievements, the need for continued progress in re-
source availability, optimization, and security exists. 
Our research is motivated by the increased inter-
est in further defining and abstracting the concept 
of military maneuver in the cyberspace domain. As 
such, our research is focused on designing, building, 
and modeling maneuverable applications. We have 
coined the phrase “maneuverable applications” to 
denote the distributed and parallel systems and 
programs that take advantage of the modification, 
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relocation, addition or removal of computing re- 
sources within the application, giving the perception 
of movement. These resources can be computation-
al, network, or storage, or can be the applications 
themselves. These actions are deliberate, purpose- 
ful and meant to achieve an advantage over adver-
sarial conditions. We have applied this approach to 
address three important topics within distributed 
and parallel systems, namely resource provision- 
ing, application optimization, and cybersecurity 
enhancement.
2. MANEUVER FOR RESOURCE PROVISIONING
The first area of interest for studying maneuver 
in cyberspace platforms is in the area of resource 
provisioning. Our work with the Job Uninterrupted 
Maneuverable MapReduce Platform shows how a big 
data environment can be provisioned in a university 
setting within the current investment of high-per-
formance computing. This is achieved by the use of 
maneuvering of nodes in and out of the cluster.
JUMMP, the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable 
MapReduce Platform [12], is an automated scheduling 
platform that provides a customized Hadoop sys-
tem within a batch-scheduled cluster environment. 
JUMMP enables an interactive pseudo-persistent 
MapReduce platform within the existing admin-
istrative structure of an academic high-perfor-
mance-computing center by “jumping” between 
nodes with minimal administrative effort. Jumping 
is implemented by the synchronization of stopping 
and starting daemon processes on different nodes 
in the cluster. Our experimental evaluation shows 
that JUMMP can be as efficient as a persistent 
Hadoop cluster on dedicated computing resources, 
depending on the jump time. Additionally, we show 
that the cluster remains stable, with good per-
formance, in the presence of jumps that occur as 
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frequently as the average length of Reduce tasks of the currently executing MapReduce 
job. JUMMP provides an attractive solution to academic institutions that desire to integrate 
Hadoop into their current computing environment within their financial, technical, and 
administrative constraints.
A. Introduction
Hadoop is an open-source software tool used to implement MapReduce [1], a parallel pro-
gramming paradigm for computation over large amounts of data using a cluster of com-
modity computer systems. Many organizations have built large-scale production data cen-
ters with dedicated computing resources for Hadoop clusters to support their analytic and 
scientific computation workloads. Hadoop has rapidly evolved and been adopted, thus cre-
ating a complex software ecosystem. System administrators are challenged to provide this 
service while maintaining a stable production environment. This is especially challenging 
at a typical centralized research institution where the computing infrastructures are de-
signed to accommodate multiple research applications within existing financial, technical, 
and administrative considerations. 
In an academic research environment, we can differentiate the usage of Hadoop into 
three different categories. The first category includes research applications that use 
Hadoop MapReduce as a tool for research purposes. These projects can either use Ma-
pReduce programs exclusively or use MapReduce programs as part of a larger workflow 
in a programming framework. Researchers may spend some time developing MapReduce 
programs and other necessary components and then focus on executing the programs to 
achieve the final results. As these are research applications, researchers typically alter-
nate between running the computations and analyzing the produced outputs. 
The second category is the study of the Hadoop MapReduce software suite itself. This 
includes studies of Hadoop MapReduce under different hardware and software configu-
rations, development of improvements to Hadoop MapReduce, and implementations of 
different alternative parallel frameworks to Hadoop MapReduce. The testing of dynamic 
execution environments for Hadoop is difficult to do in most existing deployments.
The third category in an academic setting includes users in classroom environments 
who are attempting to learn to install, operate, and maintain a Hadoop cluster. While these 
assignments usually have short run times and use small data, the nature of the students’ 
learning curve can lead to unintended consequences. In our experiences, teaching Hadoop 
MapReduce to undergraduates, we observed repeated problems, such as crashing of the 
Hadoop core processes, corruption of data on the cluster's storage nodes, and overloading 
of the cluster as students rush to complete the work before deadlines.
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B. System Design
Inspired by military maneuver, our approach is to provision Hadoop as a dynamic exe-
cution environment that can be instantiated, utilized, and decommissioned when needed 
by a user. This is achievable from user space since initialized and starting up a Hadoop 
cluster does not require any administrative privileges. However, creating individual 
Hadoop clusters imposes overhead due to configuration, data loading and retrieval, and 
shutdown of the environment. Permanently dedicating a set of computational nodes to 
individual users places increased workload on administrators who must set policies for 
scheduling of Hadoop and non-Hadoop jobs while providing fairness and equal access. 
Our goal is to facilitate the setup of user-controlled dynamic Hadoop environments 
that execute within existing scheduling policies, including resource limitation, maximum 
usage time, and priority preemption, without administrative intervention.
The Hadoop cluster uses a single dedicated node for both the distributed file system 
metadata server and MapReduce master server. This dedicated node resides outside 
the control of the scheduler. Each worker node is scheduled as an individually sched-
uled job, which allows for preemption or failure of the job to only affect a single node of 
the Hadoop cluster. Each data stor-
age and task execution node is est- 
ablished within its scheduled job. 
The job starts the Hadoop cli-
ents and connects them to the 
persistent head node. Each client 
waits for its trigger to jump. When 
the trigger to jump is received, 
the jumping node schedules its 
replacement. When notified of an 
upcoming jump of a slave node, 
the master node begins to copy 
the blocks stored on the outgoing 
node to the remaining nodes in the 
cluster. The master node imme-
diately kills any task assigned to 
the outgoing node and reassigns 
them to available worker nodes. 
The flexible and maneuverable 
design of JUMMP allows us to 
support the user requirements 
presented above. By allowing 
Figure 1. JUMMP maneuvers Hadoop client processing between nodes 
provisioning a resource within existing HPC environments
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preempted or failed nodes to submit jobs for their replacements, the Hadoop cluster 
survives, and running jobs continue to execute until completion. Figure 1 illustrates how 
processes maneuver between nodes in a cluster to perform a big data analysis application.
C. Analysis
Adding maneuverability to a Hadoop cluster will obviously degrade performance. We 
evaluate this degradation to understand the trade-offs of this system. With each jump of a 
computational node, additional overhead occurs over a non-jumping cluster. This overhead 
comes from two separate sources: the scheduler overhead and replication of data blocks. 
As previously mentioned, JUMMP schedules each client as separately scheduled jobs with-
in the supercomputing environment. Scheduling and queuing delays result in fewer work-
er nodes being available to perform map and reduce tasks. The JUMMP is undersized when 
replacement nodes in the queue are waiting to be assigned to an available node. When an 
existing node leaves the cluster, all blocks that are stored on its local storage must be repli-
cated across the cluster. The master node begins this immediately upon the decommission-
ing of the outgoing node. This data replication consumes system resources that previously 
would have been used for the execution of MapReduce jobs.
This degradation is evaluated with two separate experiments on the performance of 
JUMMP in our HPC environment. The specifications of our system nodes are shown in 
Table 1. In each experiment, a baseline performance metric is established for a non-jump-
ing Hadoop cluster by repeatedly running the same MapReduce job 100 times over a static 
dataset. The job is executed three additional times while varying the jump time for the 
cluster. We record the times of the jumps, the individual task start and stop times, and the 
overall job run time. With these results, we quantify the overhead of jumping during the 
execution of a MapReduce job. With the smaller dataset, a node can jump as fast as every 
seven minutes.
Table 1: Individual node specifications inside our compute cluster [12]
NODE HP SL250s
CPU INTEL XEON E5-2665 (2)
CORES 16
MEMORY 64 GB
LOCAL STORAGE CAPACITY 900 GB
NETWORKING INFINIBAND
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The experiments are executed on a homogeneous set of nodes within the local HPC 
environment to ensure uniformity of test results. All tests are run on an isolated pool of 
96 nodes for worker nodes. At the allocation of the initial nodes and creation of the 
JUMMP, the dataset for the experiment is imported, the nodes start jumping, and the 
MapReduce job begins to run. We use the dataset and benchmarks from PUMA, Purdue’s 
MapReduce Benchmark Suite [11]. PUMA is developed as a benchmark suite to represent a 
broad range of MapReduce applications exhibiting application characteristics with high/
low computation and high/low shuffle volumes. The parameters of the experiments are 
shown in Table 2.
The experimental results and evaluation show that JUMMP can be as efficient as a per-
sistent Hadoop cluster on dedicated computing resources, depending on the jump time. 
Additionally, results show that the cluster remains stable, with good performance, in the 
presence of jumps that occur as frequently as the average length of Reduce tasks of the 
currently executing MapReduce job. Our work and results show how maneuver can be used 
to adequately provision a MapReduce resource. Empowered by maneuver, this resource is 
available within an existing HPC environment with no additional personnel investment. 
We note that the allocation of resources that do not produce useful work represents a mon-
etary investment. Though we do not quantify this investment, it can be considered a cost 
of maneuver for resource provisioning.
3. MANEUVER FOR APPLICATION OPTIMIZATION
Our second area of interest for maneuverability in cyberspace systems is application 
optimization. Our research with the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine (FORCE) 
investigates this enhancement. FORCE is an instrumented, representative network testbed 
in which the network topology of a cluster can be maneuvered to develop novel approaches 
to optimize traffic flow and timing of datacenter traffic [6].
FORCE emulates a data center network using a programmable interconnection con-
trolled by a software-defined networking (SDN) controller. SDN combined with distributed 
and parallel applications have the potential to deliver optimized application performance 
at runtime. To investigate this enhancement and design future implementation, a data- 
Table 2: Experiment Parameters for our evaluations of JUMMP [12]
APPLICATION WORDCOUNT TERASORT
DATASET SIZE 50 GB 300 GB
NODE COUNT 8 32
JUMP TIMES [MINS] 7/10/15 20/40/60
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center with a programmable topology integrated with application state is needed. The 
FORCE advances us down the path towards this goal. We also utilize Hadoop as a case 
study of distributed and parallel applications along with a simulated Hadoop shuffle 
traffic generator.
The testbed provides initial experimental evidence of support to our hypothesis for future 
SDN research. Our experiments on the testbed show a difference in application runtime 
a factor of over 2.5 times on shuffle traffic for Hadoop MapReduce jobs and the potential 
for significant speedup in warehouse scale data centers.
A. Introduction
Modifying existing production datacenters or creating entirely new experimental ones to 
investigate the integration of SDN into datacenter networks is costly in time, dollars, and 
operational output. Historically, researchers have used controlled infrastructure, called 
testbeds, resembling real systems and networks to experiment on computing advance-
ments. SDN and datacenter researchers can benefit from this approach, providing mean-
ingful discoveries if established with realistic workloads and instrumented to provide con-
stant, measurable results. Our system is an initial step towards providing a capability that 
leads to developing infrastructure and processes to understand this integration.
Our overall research goal is to investigate the application of maneuver technologies and 
methods for optimizing the performance and energy efficiency of parallel and distributed 
applications in a cluster environment. Goals include the study of how the performance of 
distributed applications is impacted by the network topology of the datacenter [9]. SDN is 
a technology that can be used to easily and temporarily reconfigure physical and virtual 
network topologies. The FORCE testbed is a low-cost experimental platform that uses a 
networked set of single computers and virtualization to emulate the performance of whole 
racks of machines in a data center and their applications. The testbed provides an SDN 
infrastructure that can be used to study how changes in network topology can impact the 
performance of the applications.
B. Architecture
A novel design aspect of the FORCE is the use of single workstations to emulate an entire 
datacenter rack that is full of computing nodes. This emulation enables the study of the 
inter-rack networking traffic for distributed applications at a very low cost, and the study 
of how topologies impact performance.
The hardware of the FORCE includes one primary server, twelve client workstations, and 
two SDN-enabled switches. The testbed is extensible and scalable to a very large size. The 
set of computers used in our testbed is repurposed from upgraded student laboratories 
and is installed in a location that allows students to have physical access to the equipment 
throughout the system building and experimentation.
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The two network switches are 48-port gigabit Ethernet switches (Pica8 Pronto 3290 
48-port GBe OpenFlow-enabled) using OpenFlow [10], a popular SDN protocol. Two VLANs 
are established on one SDN-enabled switch for the “control” and “access” networks. The 
server and the workstations each have one connection to both of these VLANs. The 
remaining 48-port switch is connected to one of the four remaining gigabit Ethernet ports 
of the twelve workstations. This switch allows each workstation to be connected to a 
maximum of four other workstations with SDN controlled point-to-point connections. This 
switch is the primary target of the maneuver of the FORCE testbed. Figure 2 provides a 
wire diagram of the FORCE network testbed.
Figure 2. Wire diagram of the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine 
(FORCE) with a maneuverable network topology for application optimization
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The core technology empowering the cyber maneuver is a custom virtual topology build-
ing package, the FORCE. The FORCE implements a virtual network topology by installing 
forwarding rules on the SDN switches in a cluster. The topology is described in a series of 
layers using the NetworkX Python package. Each layer maintains a network graph as well 
a procedure for discovering a path between any two vertices. The lowest layer contains 
information about the physical topology of hosts, switches, interfaces, and links, including 
characteristics such as hardware addresses and link speeds. The tool then applies sub-
sequent graph layers that abstract each previous layer, building the virtual topology by 
translating edges into paths on the underlying graph. As a whole, this layered abstraction 
approach allows mapping of the desired connectivity among vertices on the highest level 
graph to the lowest level flow rules to be installed onto the SDN switches.
C. Experiment
Hadoop MapReduce is used to demonstrate the utility of the FORCE testbed. The liter-
ature [9] describes the potential speedup of MapReduce shuffle traffic that is possible by 
maneuvering datacenter racks that contain the Reduce tasks in close network proximity 
to racks that contain the Map task from the same MapReduce job. This proposed enhance-
ment requires the dynamic reallocation of point-to-point connections between the top-of-
rack switches in a two-dimensional torus topology. Our testbed is ideally suited for testing 
this optimization. 
1. Hadoop Shuffle Simulator
 The nodes comprising the testbed are not robust enough to run a real work-
load consisting of multiple Hadoop jobs or multiple virtual Hadoop nodes. To 
solve this problem, and to ensure that the testbed supports a realistic shuffle 
traffic network load that corresponds to the traffic between datacenter racks, 
we implemented a Hadoop shuffle traffic emulator within the FORCE. The emu-
lator executes a centrally controlled software suite that synchronizes bulk net-
work data transfers from Map tasks to Reduce tasks within the cluster. These 
data transfers are the same as the movement of Map tasks outputs to reducers 
across the cluster as seen in the shuffle phase of a real MapReduce job.
 Given a set of configurations and experiments, the system can deploy the em-
ulated MapReduce jobs across the cluster. These jobs perform the transfer of 
shuffle traffic. Based on the size of the data to be processed and the system 
block size, the simulator determines the number of Map tasks required for 
each job. The number of Reduce tasks is determined by a default global param-
eter or specific argument on a per job basis. After the system is configured with 
the number of Map and Reduce tasks per job and the size of the data transfer 
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between all the Map tasks and the set of Reduce tasks in each job, the transfer 
of data begins. Since we are interested in studying the inter-rack traffic, any 
Map and Reduce tasks that reside within the same virtual datacenter rack do 
not transfer data.
2. Design
 The testbed is configured as a 192-node cluster spread over twelve racks. Using 
bin scheduling as described in [9] three simultaneous MapReduce jobs are exe-
cuted running with a single Reduce rack each and three Map racks. There are 
a total of 1GB of data to transfer from each Map task to its respective Reduce 
rack. A random placement of datacenter racks is placed into a 4x3 two dimen-
sional torus topology, which simultaneously transfers the simulated shuffle 
traffic. Each experiment is executed 1000 times. The network topology and the 
shuffle times needed to complete all the transfers are recorded.
3. Analysis
 With this and other experiments, a baseline for comparison with random-
ized topologies was established by measuring the results with 500 runs us-
ing a fixed network topology with no particular distinguishing characteristics.  
Statistical analysis shows significant difference in the baseline and random 
samplings. This is our first indication that different topology placements exhibit 
better and worse congestion characteristics.
 Further analysis as shown in Figure 3 shows that worst case transfers times 
are 2.5 higher than best case transfers. A majority of the experimental runs 
fall in the middle in a high bell curve. This reinforces our hypothesis that in-
telligent maneuver of a network topology in a datacenter can maneuver away 
from worst-case situations, and may be able to maneuver toward optimal situ-
ations. These results support further investigation in future work of applying 
maneuver toward application optimization, specifically network traffic flow 
optimizations. 
 Our efforts and results show how maneuver can be used to optimize applica-
tion performance. Specifically, the FORCE shows how maneuver network topol-
ogy of the data center can improve the run-time execution shuffle traffic within 
a Hadoop cluster.
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4. MANEUVER FOR CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENT
Our third interest area for studying maneuver in cyberspace is improving cybersecur- 
ity. Our work with the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform [8] introduces a Stochastic Petri 
Net model of improving the survivability of a distributed and parallel application with 
the additions of moving target defense and deceptive defense, two of the tactics of de- 
fensive cyberspace maneuver [5]. Our extended security analysis of the model provided 
mathematical evaluations, a prototype simulator of the event, and rules of thumb for 
employment [16]. 
Distributed and parallel applications are critical information technology systems in mul-
tiple industries, including academia, military, government, financial, medical, and trans-
portation. These applications present target-rich environments for malicious attackers 
seeking to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these systems. Applying 
the military concept of defense cyber maneuver to these systems can provide protection 
and defense mechanisms that allow survivability and operational continuity. Understand-
Figure 3. Histogram of simulated shuffle times evaluating the FORCE testbed under random topologies [6]
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ing the tradeoffs between information systems security and operational performance when 
applying maneuver principles is of interest to administrators, users, and researchers. Our 
model enables the understanding and evaluation of the costs and benefits of maneuver-
ability in a distributed application environment, specifically focusing on moving target 
defense and deceptive defense strategies.
A. Introduction
Multiple institutions in academia, industry, and government have discovered the ne-
cessity of parallel and distributed computing in data-driven business processes for the 
solution of complex computational problems. The significant financial investment and 
operational reliance of these systems create a critical infrastructure that is tightly bound 
to the success of the organization. The security of these platforms is vital to the survival 
of these establishments.
Malicious actors seeking financial or intelligence gains are targeting supercomputers 
and distributed computing centers at an increasing rate. Their methods and efforts to dis-
rupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the systems require network security 
professionals and researchers to invest remarkable amounts of time and money into pro-
tecting these assets. 
We are motivated to attempt to improve the security of distributed systems by introduc-
ing the military concept of maneuver. Our approach to integrating maneuver into parallel 
and distributed computing is to add the elements of moving target defense and deceptive 
defense. The system is designed and modeled using a Stochastic Petri Net in which individ-
ual nodes maneuver between three different operating modes. The model is evaluated to 
understand how the state space and probability distributions are impacted under different 
configurations.
B. Background
Applegate [5] introduces four tactics of defensive cyber maneuver. Two of these elements 
are the subject of this application. Moving target defense is an attempt to change the attack 
surface of systems to cause an adversary to invest additional resources. This additional 
expenditure of effort increases the probability of detection, tactic compromise, and fail-
ure. Deceptive defense includes presenting decoy and seemingly susceptible systems as 
attractive targets. These targets are closely monitored and give an early indication of 
enemy activity while diverting attention away from legitimate and valuable systems. Our 
research focuses on modeling how moving target and deceptive defense can be integrated 
into a parallel and distributed computing system.
Petri Nets are a graphical, modeling system for concurrent systems. Visually a Petri Net 
is bi-partite, weighted, directional graph. There are two types of nodes, a place, indicated 
by a circle, and a transition, indicated by a straight line or bar. Weighted arcs connect 
DR. WILLIAM CLAY MOODY : DR. AMY W. APON
120 | THE CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW
places to transitions or transition to places. Tokens indicated by dots in the model can be 
found in places. Places represent conditions of the system while transitions represent ac-
tions taken when certain conditions are met. The presence of a token in a place indicates 
that a certain condition is true. A transition is considered enabled when input places have 
a number of tokens equal to or greater than the weight of the incoming edges. Enabled 
transitions can fire in a non-deterministic manner. When a transition fires, it removes to-
kens from input places equal to incoming edge weights and deposits tokens in out places 
equal to the weight of outbound edges. 
Many extensions to basic Petri Nets exist. One such extension is the Stochastic Petri 
Net (SPN). Stochastic Petri Nets add a new node called a timed transition, indicated as an 
unfilled bar. Timed transitions introduce a delay between enabling firings. This delay is 
a random variable drawn from a Poisson distribution. Each timed transition has its own 
firing rate for its delay distribution. Once enabled, each timed transition computes its ran-
dom delay. The timed transition with the shortest delay fires first. SPNs are an extension 
of Continuous Time Markov Chains and allow their associated mathematical tools to be 
applied to the analysis of SPNs. 
C. System Design
Our system is composed of multiple nodes. Each node can run in one of three modes 
and nodes are constantly maneuvering between these modes. These modes are operation-
al, idle, or deceptive. An operational node is an active contributor to the computation of 
the distributed system and is a valuable target that we want to protect. A deceptive node 
appears to an outside observer to be identical to an operational node by listening to the 
same network ports and sending and receiving traffic in statistically similar manners. The 
deceptive node, though, is not doing any constructive work for the system but running a 
monitoring tool that can detect an intruder, similar to a honeypot [13]. An idle node is a node 
that is in neither an operational nor a deceptive state. 
In our SPN model, each single node is represented with three places and four transitions. 
The three places represent the three modes of operation. The four timed transitions are 
the maneuvers between operational and idle modes and deceptive and operational modes. 
A node cannot maneuver directly between operational and deceptive modes. Arcs connect 
places and transitions all with a weight of one. A single token can be found in one of the 
three places, indicating the current running mode of this node. Timed transitions from 
operational to idle and idle to operational have the same firing rate. This rate is referred to 
as the deceptive maneuver rate since that is the rate in which a node maneuvers towards 
deception. Likewise, the transitions from deceptive to idle, and idle to operation have the 
same operational maneuver rate.
The entire system is made up of multiple individual nodes with a few configurable pa-
rameters. N represents the total number of nodes, O is the minimum number of operational 
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nodes the system must maintain, while D is the minimum deceptive nodes. It is important 
that the sum of O and D is less than N so that we can ensure we have a least one idle node 
so that the system can actually maneuver. The system wide operational maneuver rate 
is ro, while rd is the deceptive maneuver rate. The initial configuration of a system is set 
to be the minimum values of operational and deceptive nodes. Figure 4 depicts a system 
consisting of a total of eight nodes with a minimum of three operational nodes and two 
deceptive nodes.
Figure 4. The model of defensive maneuver cyber platform with eight nodes [8]
D. Analysis
To understand all the potential configurations of the system with given set of parameters, 
we need to quantify the state space of the Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform (DMCP). 
As previously mentioned, the system has a defined minimum value for the number of 
operational and deceptive nodes. Since N is fixed, the maximum value for the count of op-
erational and deceptive nodes can be calculated to be N-D and N-O respectively. The total 
number of markings or states that the Petri Net can have is quantified by summing the 
count of valid markings for each valid combination of (o,d) which is the current number of 
operational and deceptive nodes. This formula is similar to the calculation of computation 
of multistate combinations since each of the N nodes can be in state operational, deceptive, 
or idle.
For a given N, the range of possible markings is inversely proportional to the minimum 
values O and D. The lower the minimum values, the larger the marking state space. The 
largest state space is when O and D are 0 and is approximately eN. The minimum value 
for the state space is when one of the minimum levels of operational or deceptive node is 
maximized, and the other value is minimized. For instance, for N = 8, O=7 and D=0, there 
is a minimum of only 17 valid marking. As Figure 4 shows, this minimum plot is approxi-
mately on the order of log n. 
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One of the goals of the DMCP is to allow the system to change the rate of maneuver 
between deceptive and operational based on the threat conditions. Specifically, alarms 
and alerts from the embedded honeypots software in a deceptive node along with other 
external network security information will provide indications when the system should 
increase the deceptive maneuver rate. During a low threat environment, the operational 
maneuver rate can be increased so that the system has more operational capacity. We 
strive to study the impact that the maneuver rate has on the operational and deceptive 
composition of the system. An open-source SPN analysis tool [2] is used to calculate the 
steady state probabilities for the 8-3-2 DMCP shown in Figure 5. The stacked bar chart 
in Figure 5 presents the probability of states in which there are 3, 4, 5, and 6 operational 
nodes with varying ratios of the maneuver rates. As Figure 5 shows, as the probability of 
deceptive states increases, the probability of a deceptively maneuverable cluster rises to 
more than 95%. As the probability of operational mode increases then the probability of 
having 5 or more of our nodes operational (thus increasing operational output) rises to 
more than 95%. These results show that by adjusting the maneuver rates, we can influence 
the system towards operational or deceptive.
Figure 5. Marking probability of an 8-3-2 defensive maneuver cyber platform  
when varying the rates of operational and deceptive maneuver [8]
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Our attacker model used to evaluate the DMCP is a single adversary who will target only 
operational or deceptive nodes. The attacker is unable to distinguish between operational 
and deceptive nodes and selects with equal probability a random active node to target. 
Once selected, the attacker targets and attempts to gain user or elevated access to the node 
using its various exploitation tools. After a random amount of time being targeted, the 
node is considered to be compromised. [16] 
In order to increase the probability of survival, we desire to maximize the probability 
that a target node is deceptive and the probability that targeted operational nodes maneu-
ver before the node can be fully compromised. We created a series of equations showing 
how each variable in the system can be adjusted to increase these probabilities. We present 
a series of rules of thumb for system administrators to employ to find the correct balance 
between security and operations of a cluster.
Finally, we built a prototype maneuver resource maneuver manager to validate the math-
ematical model. This system incorporates a discrete event simulator allowing each system 
variable to be adjusted to view the trade-off between operations and security. The system 
also provides visualization of the current system state, allowing an experimental run to be 
followed and tracked by researchers. The maneuver manager allows us to refine our rules 
of thumb for deployment of the system. These models provide the foundation for a system 
to be built that extends experimentation of the value of cyber maneuver to the security of 
computing systems.
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented our work in designing, building, and modeling maneuver applications 
to advance the state of the art in distributed and parallel computing. This work demon-
strates how the military concept of maneuver can be applied to distributed computing in 
multiple facets. 
In the area of resource provisioning, the Job Uninterrupted Maneuverable MapReduce 
Platform deploys a Hadoop cluster within an existing academic high performance-comput-
ing (HPC) environment. JUMMP supports high availability and continuous computing for 
research and education while incurring no additional financial or administrative overhead. 
It is shown to be as efficient as a persistent Hadoop cluster on dedicated computing re-
sources, depending on the jump time. The cluster remains stable, with good performance, 
in the presence of jumps that occur as frequently as the average lengths of Reduce tasks. 
In the area of application optimization, the Flow Optimized Route Configuration Engine 
provides the design and prototype development of a datacenter testbed with a reprogram-
mable network topology. The FORCE testbed includes a Virtual Topology Engine that 
builds virtual network topologies over physical links with SDN flows and a Flow Network 
Evaluation system to generate a network congestion estimation score. We highlight the 
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design and portray the development of a Hadoop shuffle traffic simulator placing realistic 
loads on datacenter networks. Experimental results indicate placement of computation 
racks within a datacenter topology potentially has significant impact on the Hadoop shuffle 
traffic completion time. 
Our research into modeling a Defensive Maneuver Cyber Platform with Stochastic Petri 
Nets demonstrates cybersecurity improvement through maneuver. This model introduces 
a distributed and parallel application utilizing moving target defense and deceptive 
defense tactics to increase survivability in the presence of a cyberattack. An SPN model is 
used to analyze the trade-offs between security and operations in the Defensive Maneuver 
Cyber Platform.   
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